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Abstract: Replica attack is a critical concern in the security of wireless sensor networks. 
We employ mobile nodes as patrollers to detect replicas distributed in different zones in a 
network,  in  which  a  basic  patrol  detection  protocol  and  two  detection  algorithms  for 
stationary and mobile modes are presented. Then we perform security analysis to discuss 
the  defense  strategies  against  the  possible  attacks  on  the  proposed  detection  protocol. 
Moreover, we show the advantages of the proposed protocol by discussing and comparing 
the communication cost and detection probability with some existing methods. 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed in hostile environments for their unattended nature 
which makes nodes in the network dangerous to be captured by an adversary. The adversary can 
compromise the captured nodes and obtain all the secrets of the nodes, replicate the compromised 
nodes to get many replicas with the same node identity. Then she can launch an insidious attack with 
these “legitimate” nodes.  
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The compromised node and its replicas can join the network and act as any benign nodes. This is 
very harmful to the network. As discussed in references [1-3], many detection methods work well to 
detect the compromised node under the assumption that the benign nodes are in majority in global and 
local  areas,  but  they  didn’t  focus  on  replica  attacks,  in  which  the  adversary  has  many  malicious 
replicas, and the assumption of “benign nodes in majority” has thus failed, so we should exclude the 
replicas before using these compromised node detection methods.  
2. Related Work and Network Assumptions 
2.1. Related Work 
After Parno, Perrig et al. [4] pointed out the concept of replica attack, some detection methods were 
proposed,  such  as  centralized  detection,  local  detection,  and  distributed  detection.  In  general, 
centralized methods will bring out the problem of single point failure, and many communications are 
converged in the neighborhood of the central node. Local detection doesn’t deal with the replicas 
deployed in different zones and the communication is too high in the distributed detection. Parno, 
Perrig et al. present randomized multicast and line-selected multicast which use some witness nodes to 
replace the whole network detection and ensure the detection probability by  the birthday paradox 
theory. Ho et al. [5] further decrease the communication cost by using group deployment knowledge. 
Ho et al. [6] also present a SPRT method for replica detection in mobile sensor networks, in which 
all sensors are mobile. Pietro, Oligeri et al. [7] consider another type of mobile sensor network in 
which mobile sinks visit stationary sensors and collect the data once in each round. In this letter, we 
use mobile nodes acting as the mobile sink described in [7] to patrol the stationary sensors and detect 
the replicas. This likes the policeman in the real society scenario where he patrols the streets to find 
the bad person which is more efficient than all the citizen checking and report their neighbors. 
2.2. Network Assumptions 
In our network, there are two types of nodes: mobile nodes serving as patrollers and sensor nodes, 
which  we  also  call  ordinary  or  stationary  nodes.  Mobile  sensor  devices  are  more  powerful  than 
stationary ones in terms of battery power, storage and communication band. The mobile nodes are also 
able  to  obtain  their  location  information.  The  sensors  organize  a  two-dimension  stationary  sensor 
network where the locations of sensors do not change after deployment.  
We assume that all direct communication links between nodes are bidirectional. Every node has a 
unique ID in the network which is assigned by the network operator before deployment. An identity-
based public key scheme and time synchronization system are employed for the nodes and network as 
the most common attack detection scheme [4,5]. We also assume there is a maximum speed of the 
mobile nodes in this system as Ho et al. [5]. This maximum speed assumption can be used to identify 
the replicas of mobile nodes if they move faster than the speed limitation. 
The  adversary  has  the  ability  to  compromise  a  limited  number  of  nodes,  fully  control  the 
compromised node, and produce many replicas of compromised nodes to enlarge the attack ability. We 
assume that the adversary can’t capture enough nodes to have a significant influence on the network, 
but  may  fully  control  the  whole  network  by  replicating  many  replicas.  We  also  assume  that  the Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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adversary can’t create new IDs. Thus the goal of this paper is finding and revoking all the replicas with 
the same ID to ensure the security of the network. 
3. Patrol-based Replica Detection Protocol  
We will detect the replicas by the assumptions presented in Section 2. If two or more sensors in 
different locations have a same ID, then all the nodes with the ID will be regarded as compromised 
node or its replicas. Also, if a mobile node moves with a speed higher than the denoted maximum 
speed, it will be regarded as a replica attack. 
3.1. Basic Patrol Protocol  
The mobile nodes patrol the networks and send their claim messages to sensors. The sensors should 
get their secret material from the patroller at the proceeding round, or else, it will be excluded from the 
network in next round.  
In the first round, the networks should be initialized. We assume that there are no any attacks at the 
initial round as in most of the literature [4]. Each node will be patrolled by at least two mobile nodes. 
After receiving the location messages, the stationary node N takes the mobile nodes who patrolled him 
as the anchor nodes, then using some localization algorithms, such as presented in literature[8], to 
obtain their location (xN, yN), and save (xN, yN) as his own location LN. 
Figure 1. Basic frame patrol detection protocol. 
 
After the initial round, each round is divided into some intervals. In each interval, a patroller will 
move to a zone to broadcast its claim message. Then the stationary nodes will communicate with a 
mobile patroller by using the patrol detection protocol as shown in Figure1 in every round.  
As shown in Figure 1, when a mobile patrol node P moves to a new zone, it first discovers its 
location (xP, yP) and then broadcasts its patrol claim CP = {P||(xP, yP)||T||SigP}, where T is the claim 
sent time, SigP is the signature generated by node P’s private key KS(P). In fact, we usually have : 
  } || ) (   {   Sig (P) KS T , y x P P P    (1)  
Upon receiving CP, every neighboring node N checks whether T is valid or not. If:  
|T’ − T| > δ + ε 
where T’ is the claim receipt time at N, δ is the estimated transmission delay of claim and, ε is an 
acceptable  error  of  the  time  synchronization  system  (for  ease  of  exposition  and  without  loss  of 
generality, we use the same symbol ε in this letter to denote the acceptable errors of all aspects of the 
networks). Then node N will ignore the request. Otherwise, N will compute the distance d’ between his 
own position (xN, yN) and the patroller’s claimed position (xP, yP), and compute the relative distance d 
(1)  P computes his location, and 
PN: Cp= {P||(xP, yP)||T||SigP} 
(2)  N executes the processing algorithm,  
NP: AN = {N|| (xN, yN)||SigN) 
(3)  P executes the processing algorithm 
P/NAll Network: Revoke the Replicas 
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from the received signal power. Then N will compare d with d’. If the difference between the two 
values  exceeds  the  system  accepted  error  ε,  the  node  will  broadcast  a  surveillance  message  
SN = {N||P ||(xN, yN) || SigN ||SigP} to report a fault, where SigP is forwarded from P’s claim. If the 
difference is acceptable, it sends AN = {N|| (xN, yN)||SigN) to P, then save  and forwards P’s claim to 
the patroller in the next round with probability p.  
After collecting the answer message AN, P will check the location of node N, and if the distance is 
larger than the signal range, it ignores the wrong message. Otherwise, P checks the ID of the answer 
message by using the security assumption “A benign ID only has one location”. Then it saves the 
answer from the benign node in a white list, saves the replica node’s ID in a blacklist, and revokes the 
replicas’ ID by refusing to distribute secrete material and broadcasting its two answer messages to 
other mobiles nodes. Then P will move to other location to send his patrol claim in another interval. 
After  a  round,  it  collects  all  the  saved  information  of  the  white  and  blacklists  to  the  user  when 
collecting the sensing data.  
3.2. Replicas Detection  
In our network model, there are two types of nodes: patrol nodes and ordinary sensors. So there are 
two kinds of replica detection algorithms. 
Replica Node Detection: In our network assumption, each sensor node has a unique ID and is static 
after it is deployed. Under the security assumption “A benign ID only has one location”, we detect 
replicas by using patrol nodes to seek for the ID in more than one location. If the replicas are deployed 
in a zone where a patrol node collects their answer message in a patrol interval, then the patroller can 
revoke  them  immediately  after  he  receives  the  second  answer  and  the  distance  between  the  two 
location exceeds ε. Else if the replicas’ answers are collected by different patrol nodes, then they will 
be found by the base station or by exchange messages of patrollers after a round. After receiving AN, P 
executes the following Node Replica Detection Algorithm.  
Figure 2. Detection algorithm of node replica. 
 
Replica Patroller Detection: If the adversary compromises and replicates the patrol node, then the 
detection assumption for the static sensor nodes will not work, because the benign mobile patrol node 
is treated as replica due to the continuous change in locations. 
Fortunately, mobility provides  us  with  some clues to help resolve the mobile replica detection 
problem. Firstly, a benign mobile patroller will wait for the answer message after he reaches a new 
do { 
(1)  if N  is in black list, continue; 
(2)  if N  is in white list, revoke N and put N 
into black list, continue;  
(3)  P computes N’s location, denotes as LN;  
(4)  if  || LN − (xN, yN)|| <ε, put N into white list, 
else put N into black list, Continue;  
} until no AN or Interval is time out. 
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position and sends his claim in time T., so there is a static period Interval after the patrol broadcasts his 
claim. Accordingly, if the patroller node moves and changes its position in time (T, T + Interval), then 
it is highly likely that at least two nodes with the same identity are present in the networks. Further, the 
mobile patroller should never move faster than the system-configured maximum speed Vmax. As a 
result, we use the fact that an uncompromised patroller should never move at speeds in excess of Vmax 
and satisfies formula (1) as following: 
max
2 1
2 1
|| ||
 
V
interval T T
|| L   ||L

 
   (2)  
where Li, i = 1, 2, are the location in time Ti respectively, and the (Li, Ti) are refined from P’s claims 
forwarded by the monitor sensor nodes in the patrol protocol.  
After receiving the patrol claim CP from P, the ordinary node executes following operations shown 
as the pseudo-code to detect patrol replicas.  
Figure 3. Detection algorithm of patroller replica. 
 
In the algorithm shown in Figure 3, the sensors broadcast CP with probability p as surveillance. 
This  measure  provides  evidence  for  mobile  replica  detection,  and  the  probability  p  decreases  
network traffic.  
4. Security and Performance  
4.1. Security Analysis  
The proposed schemes should perform replicas dtection in a secure manner. Let us discuss attacks that 
might be launched by the attacker and the defense strategies against such attacks in our protocol. 
if P is  not in black list: 
(1)  N computes d and d’ from the signal 
power  and  the  received  location 
respectively. 
(2)  if  || d – d’ || > ε, revokes P and puts P 
into black list, break the time slots. 
(3)  if  P  is  not  in  the  stock  list,  N 
broadcast CP saves CP in a stock list 
with  probability  p  for  surveillance, 
sends  the  answer  message  AN, 
break the time slots. 
(4)  else  compares  two  claim  message, 
denoted as C1P and C2P respectively:  
  if  |  T1  –  T2  |>    interval,  and 
formula (2) is satisfied, delete P 
from  its  stock  list,  sends  the 
answer message AN, break the 
time slots. 
  else revokes P and puts P into 
black list, break the time slots. 
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Firstly, a malicious sensor may attempt to forge a claim for defaming the patroller. However, there is a 
signature of P in CP. The malicious node cannot get a fresh P’s signature in a forge time T, because the 
time T is encrypted by the private key of P in SigP defined in formula (1). The malicious node cannot 
forge a location too. So the SigP present a binding of time and location, which provides the integrity 
and freshness of the claim message.  
Similarly, a malicious patroller will try to revoke good nodes as a replica. If P revoke a node N, it is 
required to forward N’s answer message AN = {N|| (xN, yN) ||T|| SigN) from two different place in time T. 
It is difficult to forge N’s fresh signature in position (xN, yN). 
Moreover, the adversary cannot gain much benefit from collusion of malicious nodes and patroller. 
For example, the adversary will deploy many replicas in the zone of a malicious patroller. But the 
malicious patroller cannot give a new ID to the replica nodes and the zone will be patrolled by another 
patrol node in next round. Then the benefit is that the replica nodes will not be revoked in a round. But 
the high density of the replicas will help to be found in next round, and it is harmful to hide the 
malicious patroller. If we require the sensor nodes to show their admission by binding the patroller’s 
Signature and its own position with the transmitting message in the run time, then its execution will be 
restricted further.  
Finally, if the multiple replicas of a single node form a physically close group and they can answer 
all claims with the same location, then it will not be detected by the patrol protocol. But this group 
strategy substantially limits the region affected by the replicas and thus the attacker will not gain much 
benefit from using the replicas in the limited region. For example, in a false data injection attack, it 
would be easy to ensure that only one of the replicas’ data values at a time is accepted by the data 
aggregators. Similarly, in network application protocols, only one of the replicas’ input values at a 
time would be taken by their neighbors. In this sense, multiple nodes with the same ID would not have 
more influence in a region than a single node. 
4.2. Performance Analysis  
We deploy m mobile nodes and n sensor nodes in a field, and we divide the deployment field into k 
claim zones. Table.1 gives the symbols and their notations. 
Table 1. Some Notations used in this section. 
Symbols   Notation 
Interval   Time period for patrolling a zone. 
Round  Time period for the user to collect data 
k  Total number of zones 
n  Total number of sensors 
m  Number of mobile nodes  
r  Replicas number of  a compromised node 
 
Now we discuss the performance of our detection protocol with these parameters. In our methods, 
we add the mobile nodes to an existed static sensor network. If the network has a base station, then we 
use the convenience from the base station. If there is no base station, then the patrols should contact to 
exchange the detected information. At first, we consider the scenario that the network has a base Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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station. As the trusted centre, base station can arrange the mobile nodes to patrol the nodes. If there are 
1 1   

 
 
m
k  intervals in a round, then we can set each zone to be patrol at least once at a round. That is to 
say, the nodes of m zones receive and answer message at each interval. The whole communications of 
the network are  n m
k
n
m
k
 




    


 


  

 
  1 1 . As introduced in reference [4], the communication of centralized 
detection is  ) ( n n O , our method is much better than that. In fact, we have hierarchy network architecture 
in this case. There are three layers: a base station, m mobile nodes serve as sink, and n sensor nodes. 
Now we consider the communication cost of local detection of hierarchy network with m sink nodes. 
The detection costs within a zone are 
m
n .  
The average cost of a sink sending the message to the base station are  
n m
m
n
   
Then the whole cost are 
) ( n m O n
m
n
m   




    
It is also higher than our method. Align better all these equations. 
Further, we consider  the scenario without a base station in the network. If we set ([k/m–1]+1) 
intervals in a round as the case with a base station in the network, then we can’t detect the replicas 
among different zones though all the nodes are patrolled at a round. The naï ve thinking is that each 
pair  of  mobile  nodes  communicates  and  exchanges  all  the  answer  messages  at  each  round.  The 
communications are 
) 1 ( 2
2   k k Ck  
The cost is too high with the consideration of the exchanged messages.  
In fact, it is difficult that each zone will be visited once by a mobile node in this case.  The mobile 
nodes should cost more communication to  set the global arrangements of the  patrol process. In the 
following, we set the mobile nodes without global awareness move as the random z one model as the 
random waypoint model defined by [7], in which each patrol randomly choose a  destination zone at 
each interval. We assume that a round has x intervals, then the whole communications are (x*n*m/k ). 
Now we discuss the detection probabilities of a node with r replicas: N1, N2, … Nr. Each replica has 
k
m probability to be patrolled at an interval, and it has x *m/k chances to be visit by mobile nodes. 
Following the standard derivation of the birthday paradox, the probability P1 that x *m/k mobile nodes 
patrol the zone located by N1 does not patrol the N2’s zone is given by: 
k
x m
k
x m
P






 
  2 1 1  
Similarly, the probability Pi that ) / ( k x m i   mobile nodes that patrol the zones located by one replica 
of { N1, N2, …, Ni} does not patrol the Ni+1’s zone is given by: 
k
x m
i k
x m i
P






  
  2 1  
Thus, the probability Pnone that no two zones with any nodes in {N1, N2, … Nr} are patrolled by a 
mobile nodes is: Sensors 2011, 11                                       
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So the detection probability is: 
3
2 2
2
) 1 (
-
detection 1 k
r r x m
e P
   
    (3)  
If we have m = k and x = k
1/2, Pdetection is greater than 63% in formula (3) when r = 2. And Pdetection 
will be greater than 95% if r = 3. In this case, the communication cost are (n*k
1/2), which is O(n) if k is 
set independent of n. 
We show the communication cost of existing work in Table 2. Contrasted with the context, our 
method  is  much  less  than  O(n
2)  of  Randomized  Multicast  in  communication  cost  with  the  same 
detection performance, and shows good detection performance over Line-Selected Multicast method 
with O(n*k
1/2) communication cost over its O(n*n
1/2), in which k is much smaller than n. 
Table 2. Communication cost. Scale and align equations. 
  Detection Methods  Communications 
With 
Base 
station 
Centralized Detection  O(n*n
1/2) 
Hierarchy Detection  O(n*k) 
SPRT for mobile nodes [5]  O(n*n
1/2) 
Our method  O(n) 
Without 
Base 
Station 
Randomized Multicast [4]  O(n
2) 
Line-Selected Multicast [4]  O(n*n
1/2) 
Group deployment [6] 
Determined by 
Deployment Accuracy 
Our method  O(n*k
1/2) 
5. Conclusions 
We use mobile nodes as patrollers to detect replica nodes in wireless sensor networks, and present a 
patrol detection protocol and related algorithms. Contrasted with existing work, our detection protocol 
gets best detection performance with similar communication cost and the lowest communication cost 
with similar detection rates. That is to say, the use of mobile nodes can save the energy of static nodes 
and prolong the lifetime of the whole network.  
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